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THE REPRESENTATIVE POWER OF THE 
SHAREHOLDERS’ GENERAL MEETING UNDER 
CHINESE LAW 
Charles Zhen Qu† 
Abstract: Under China’s company law regime, the power to represent the 
company resides not in the board of directors but in an individual person called a legal 
representative (fading daibiaoren) who is a senior officer of the company.  The 
mechanism of legal representative, however, is often rendered ineffective as it is 
inherently susceptible to abuse.  The mechanism becomes dysfunctional when the legal 
representative is unavailable.  The legal representative’s unavailability, especially when 
the board of directors is also ineffective, raises the question of whether the general 
meeting has the power to control corporate actions.  To answer this question, this Article 
considers the legal nature of the legal representative’s role, examines the allocation of the 
company’s decisionmaking and representative powers, and reviews a small corpus of 
recent cases which have been or could have been decided on the basis of the general 
meeting’s power of representation.  This Article argues that the legal representative 
should be regarded as an agent rather than as an organ of the company, and a company’s 
general meeting should be able to exercise the company’s decision-making and 
representative power when both the board of directors and the legal representative are 
ineffective, given the nature of the legal representative’s role and the power allocation 
under the company law regime in China. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A company’s ability to conduct proceedings is crucial to the protection 
of its interests and the interests of its stakeholders.  It is, therefore, important 
to ensure that the company will be able to maintain its litigation competence 
at all times and in all circumstances.  A company, as a legal abstraction, must 
act through natural persons.1  Under China’s civil law2 and company law 
regimes, the power to represent the company is not vested in the board3 but 
in an individual person, termed the legal representative.4  The legal 
                                           
†
 B.A. (East China Normal University); L.L.B., L.L.M. (University of New South Wales); Ph.D 
(Australian National University); Assistant Professor, Law School, City University of Hong Kong.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this Article by Mr. Stefan 
Lo. 
1
 PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 129 (Sweet & 
Maxwell 7th ed. 2003). 
2
 The phrase “civil law” is used here to mean the law of civil or private rights rather than the 
Western European system of codified laws. 
3
 See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.  There are exceptions in some specified circumstances. 
4
 In contrast, a company incorporated in a common law jurisdiction normally acts through two 
groups of individuals, namely, the board of directors and the shareholders’ general meeting. The board of 
directors is, in ordinary circumstances, granted the power to manage the affairs of the company, which 
includes the power to represent the company in corporate proceedings.  See DAVIES, supra note 1, at 294; 
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representative represents the company, as a legal person,5 to exercise its 
powers in accordance with the law and the constitution of the legal person.6  
The legal representative of a company is normally the chairperson of the 
board of directors, or if the company does not have a board, the executive 
director or company manager.7  The legal representative’s appointment must 
be approved by and registered with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
Administration (“BICA”), the government department responsible for 
company registration. 
The mechanism of the legal representative, however, is often rendered 
inefficient because it is inherently susceptible to abuse.  The mechanism 
becomes ineffective when the legal representative who is capable of 
faithfully implementing decisions of the company is unavailable.  The 
requirement that the BICA approve and register the legal representative 
often creates circumstances where the company does not have a legal 
representative, for example, in circumstances where a legal representative is 
dismissed and the BICA does not complete approval and registration of the 
replacement legal representative.  The previous legal representative whose 
name still appears on the BICA’s registry before the re-registration is 
complete has opportunities to take unauthorized actions against the interests 
of the company.8  The representative is also unavailable when the legal 
representative decides not to act or to act inconsistently with the 
shareholders’ interests.  Because the power of representation is vested in a 
single person, the legal representative often has opportunities to take 
unauthorized transactional or litigational actions in the name of the 
company.  These actions are often tainted with conflicts of interests or 
                                                                                                                              
G. D. Goldberg, Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 1948, 33 MOD. L. REV. 177, 180-81 (1970); 
Ross Grantham, The Reserve Powers of Company Shareholders, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 36, 36-39 (2004). 
5
  A legal person is “[a]n entity on which a legal system confers rights and imposes duties.”  
BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 680 (1997). 
6
  General Code of the Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 
12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 38, translated in STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1985-86, at 3 [hereinafter General Code of the Civil Law]. 
7
  See JIAN FU & JIE YUAN, PRC COMPANY & SECURITIES LAWS–A PRACTICAL GUIDE 41-42 (2006).  
A limited liability company shall appoint a manager to manage the day-to-day business of the company to 
implement the decisions of the board of directors.  Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 50, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2007) (P.R.C.).  Similarly, a company limited by shares is required to appoint a manager to 
manage the day-to-day business of the company to implement the decisions of the board of directors.  Id. 
art. 114. 
8
  Shen Li, You gu dong hui jue ding de fa ding dai biao ren ying ju you gong si de su song dai biao 
quan [The Legal Representative Appointed by the General Meeting Should Have Power of Representation] 
(Shanghai Mun. First Interm. People’s Ct.), http://www.companylawyer.com.cn/ 
gdqy/zxgdqydbh/20051215113225.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2007). 
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fraud.9  A legal representative, for example, will hardly ever be willing to 
implement the company’s decision to sue that legal representative. 
There have long been calls to abolish the legal representative system 
in China.10  However, after considering the aforementioned calls for its 
abolition, lawmakers in the 2005 amendment to China’s Company Law11 
(“2005 Company Law”) reaffirmed the role of the legal representative, 
making its abolition unrealistic in the near future.12  To live with this system 
of representation, it is necessary to find ways to remedy the deficiencies of 
the system in a principled manner and consistent with legal doctrine.  This 
Article first suggests that the legal representative should be regarded as an 
agent, rather than an organ, of the company.  Then, when the legal 
representative becomes dysfunctional for any number of reasons, the 
company’s general meeting should be permitted to exercise the company’s 
decision-making and representative power for the company. 
The remainder of this Article is organized into four parts.  Part II 
charts the development of the company law regime in China.  Part III 
provides an overview and background of the 2005 Company Law and its 
salient features regarding a company’s governance structure.  Part IV 
examines the role of the legal representative.  Part V considers the 
circumstances in which, and the doctrinal bases on which, the general 
meeting has been, or should have been, given power to represent the 
company in litigation. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPANY LAW 
China’s first company law legislation was promulgated by the late 
Qing Dynasty in 1904 for the purpose of competing against the foreign 
                                           
9
  See Yang Ji, Zhongguo gu fen gong si fa ding dai biao ren zhi du de zun fei [The Regime of Legal 
Representative for China’s Joint Stock Companies: To Preserve or to Abolish?], 26(6) XIAN DAI FA XUE 
[MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 125, 127 n.1 (2004). 
10
  See id. at 125; Gu Minkang, Gong si fa ding dai biao ren de bi jiao yan jiu [Comparative 
Research on the Company Legal Representative], 1 HUA DONG ZHENG FA XUE YUAN XUE BAO [EAST CHINA 
COLLEGE OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL] 49 (1998); Xu Yanbing, Fa ding dai biao ren zhi du 
de bi duan ji wan shan [The Deficiency and Perfection of the Legal Representative System], 7 FA XUE [LAW 
SCIENCE] 10 (2004). 
11
  Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, 
effective Jan. 1, 2006), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2005 
Company Law]. 
12
  Id. art. 13.  This decision was based on the consideration that the legal representative practice had 
already become a custom in the company law practice in China, and a good faith mechanism controlling 
company transactions was yet to be built up.  THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK 
COMMITTEE, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONG SI FA SHI YI [P.R.C. COMPANY LAW COMMENTARY] 
33 (Law Press 2005) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE]. 
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enterprises present in China.13  The legislation was based on the 1856 Joint 
Stock Companies Act of the United Kingdom and the Commercial Code of 
Japan.14  The company law statute of the Qing era was hardly used until the 
Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1912.15  Two years later, the government of 
the Republic of China promulgated Company Regulations using the 
structure of Japan’s Commercial Code.16  In 1929, the Nanjing Nationalist 
government continued the reform by enacting a new piece of legislation, the 
Company Law.17  This statute went on to become the foundation of Taiwan’s 
Company Code.18 
The 1929 Company Law became invalid in October 1949 when the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) was established.19  Between 1949 and 
1979, no official company legislation was enacted.20  In 1979, after adopting 
the open door policy, the PRC enacted the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Enterprises Law (“EJV Law”),21 which governed the formation and 
operation of Sino-foreign equity joint venture companies.22  The EJV Law 
was enacted in response to the perceived urgent need for a predictable legal 
framework that would help foreign investors to invest in China. 
In contrast, the need to enact a domestic company law was less urgent, 
given that most of the companies at that stage were state-owned or 
collectively-owned enterprises.23  Between 1979 and 1993, the PRC enacted 
numerous statutes and regulations regulating foreign investment and 
domestic company activities.  In 1993, the PRC enacted the Company Law 
(“1993 Company Law”),24 the first company legislation applicable to 
domestic companies.25  By the end of the last century, it became clear that 
                                           
13
  Louisa Lam & Lin Ketong, Corporate Governance, in 1 CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE ¶ 160-110, 
¶ 160-120 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2004). 
14
  Graham Brown & Wei Xin, Introduction to Company Law, in 1 CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE, 
supra note 13, ¶ 10-110, ¶ 10-120.  Brown & Wei Xin refer to the 1856 Act as “the British Company Law 
of 1856,” although it is generally referenced as the Joint Stock Companies Act. 
15
  Id. 
16
  Id. 
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. 
19
  Id. ¶ 10-130. 
20
  Id.  Cf. id. (discussing a small number of regulations issued to regulate privately owned-
enterprises during the relevant period, including Provisional Regulations on Privately Owned Enterprises 
1950, and relationships among state-owned enterprises, such as Regulations on the Working Relations 
Between State-Owned Manufacturing Enterprises (Draft) 1961). 
21
  Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective July 8, 1979), translated in 1 P.R.C. LAWS 150. 
22
  Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 10-130. 
23
  Id. 
24
  Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, 
effective July 1, 1994), translated in 5 P.R.C. LAWS 269 [hereinafter 1993 Company Law]. 
25
  See Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 10-140. 
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the 1993 Company Law was inadequate and had become an impediment to 
China’s economic reform.26  This led to a minor revision of the 1993 
Company Law in 199927 and a major amendment in 2005.28  The 2005 
Company Law came into effect on January 1, 2006.29 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE 2005 COMPANY LAW AND THE SALIENT 
FEATURES OF THE COMPANY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE THEREIN 
A. The Structure of the Company Law 
The 2005 Company Law regulates the incorporation, governance, and 
operation of two types of companies:  limited liability companies and 
companies limited by shares.30  These two types of companies are roughly 
equivalent to what are termed “private companies” and “public companies” 
recognized under the company legislation of commonwealth jurisdictions.31 
B. Salient Features of the Governance Structure 
The governance structure under the 2005 Company Law features the 
following five salient characteristics. 
1. A Company Functions Through Three Organs 
A company in China, regardless of its type, normally has three 
corporate organs:32  the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of 
directors, and the supervisory board.33  Critics contend that a company may 
have a company manager34 and the company’s legal representative as a 
                                           
26
  Craig Anderson & Bingna Guo, Corporate Governance Under the New Company Law (Part 1): 
Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder Protection, in CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2006, at 17-18.  The 
inadequacy of the 2003 Company Law manifested in weak shareholder protection and a lack of civil 
enforcement mechanisms.  The need for reform of the Company Law became clear when China 
experienced a number of high profile corporate scandals in the years immediately antecedent to the 2005 
revision of the Company Law.  Id. at 18. 
27
  Brown & Wei Xin, supra note 14, ¶ 12-120. 
28
  FU & JIE YUAN, supra note 7, at 5. 
29
  See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11. 
30
  See id. chs. II, IV.  
31
  See id.  On classifications of companies in common law jurisdictions, see DAVIES, supra note 1, at 
12; H. A. J. FORD, ROBERT P. AUSTIN & IAN M. RAMSAY, FORD’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 148-
49 (12th ed. 2005). 
32
  See infra text accompanying note 68 for a discussion on the meaning of the word “organ.” 
33
  See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, ch. II, § 2, ch. IV, §§ 2-4.  
34
  See, e.g., Lam & Lin Ketong, supra note 13, ¶ 163-520. 
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fourth or even fifth organ.35  Where the scope of business or the number of 
shareholders is relatively small, however, the company may have one 
executive director instead of a board of directors, and one or two supervisors 
in lieu of a supervisory board.36 
2. Corporate Powers Are Statutorily Allocated 
Under the 2005 Company Law, the general meeting is regarded as the 
company’s power organ.37  The powers of the general meeting include the 
power to determine the company’s management policies and investment 
plans; appoint and dismiss directors and supervisors while determining the 
remuneration of the directors and supervisors; examine and approve reports 
prepared by the directors and supervisors; and examine the budget plan, 
accounting plan, and distribution plan.38  The general meeting also has 
control over the board of directors,39 as well as power to amend the 
company’s constitution, change the amount of the company’s registered 
capital, and issue debt securities.40  The shareholders’ general meeting forms 
the company’s will and intention in the sense that the most important matters 
of the company are determined by the general meeting.41 
The board of directors is the company’s executive organ.42  It manages 
the company by exercising its powers in formulating various types of 
business plans, implementing the general meeting’s resolutions, determining 
the company’s internal management structure, and appointing management 
and financial staff.43  The board reports to the general meeting and must 
implement the resolutions of the general meeting.44  The board has the 
power, upon a request by the shareholders in writing, to bring actions against 
                                           
35
  See, e.g., JIANG PING ET AL., XIN BIAN GONG SI FA JIAO CHENG [A NEW TEXTBOOK ON COMPANY 
LAW] 68 (1994). 
36
  See 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 51, 52.  
37
  See id. art. 37.  
38
  Id. arts. 38, 100. 
39
  See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
40
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 38, 100.  
41
  WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA YUAN LI [PRINCIPLES OF CHINA’S 
COMPANY LAW] 47, 189-91, 194-95 (1998); JIANG PING ET AL., supra note 35, at 138.  See also SHI 
SHAOXIA, GONGSIFA [COMPANY LAW] 102 (1996); GAO CHENGDE & XIAO ZHIHE, ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA 
SHI WU [PRACTICE IN CHINA’S COMPANIES] 34 (1994). 
42
  This is not expressly provided in the 2005 Company Law.  However, the Legal System Working 
Committee of China’s Parliament, the National People’s Congress, states in its interpretation of the 2005 
Company Law that the board of directors is a compulsory, permanent management decision-making organ 
of the company.  See THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE, supra note 
12, at 73. 
43
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 47; WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 114, 
211-12. 
44
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 47. 
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an errant member of the supervisory board if the company has suffered a 
loss because of the defaulting supervisor’s breach of law, regulations, or the 
company’s constitution.45  The board of directors forms the company’s 
management will and intention.46 
The supervisory board is the company’s supervisory organ.  It 
supervises the activities of the board of directors.47  It has the power to 
examine the financial affairs of the company and to make recommendations 
about the removal of directors or senior executives48 who have breached the 
law, administrative regulations, the company’s constitution, or the 
resolutions of the general meeting.  The board also has the power to bring 
legal action against directors or senior executives upon the request of a 
shareholder if the company has suffered a loss because of these officers’ 
breach of the law, administrative regulations, or the company’s 
constitution.49  The supervisory board forms the company’s supervisory will 
and intention in the sense that the board makes the decision to remove—or 
to commence proceedings against—defaulting directors or senior officers.50 
3. No General Power of Management Is Granted to the Board of 
Directors 
The powers that the 2005 Company Law allocates to the three 
corporate organs are all specific.  Unlike in common law jurisdictions, the 
2005 Company Law allocates no general power of management to the board 
of directors.51  The power allocation provisions in company constitutions 
tend to be identical or similar to the power allocation provisions of the 2005 
Company Law.52 
                                           
45
  Id. art. 152.  See also infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
46
  WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 114, 211-12; SHI SHAOXIA, supra note 41, at 232.  
Note, however, that the directors are subject to the absolute control of the general meeting.  They have a 
statutory obligation to implement the resolutions of the general meeting.  2005 Company Law, supra note 
11, arts. 47(2), 109.  
47
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 54, 119. 
48
  “Senior officers” is defined to mean the company manager, the deputy manager, the chief finance 
officer, the secretary of a listed company, and other people defined as senior officers in the company’s 
constitution.  Id. art. 217.   
49
  Id. arts. 54(6), 150, 152. The supervisory board was not given the power to sue delinquent 
directors under the 1993 Company Law. 
50
  See 1993 Company Law, supra note 24, arts 48, 126; 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 54, 
55, 119, 152.  
51
  In common law jurisdictions, the power of managing the business of the company is normally 
vested in the board of directors by virtue of a division of power regulation in the company’s constitution. 
FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 216; Charles Zhen Qu, Some Reflections on the General Meeting’s Power to 
Control Corporate Proceedings, 36(3) COMMON L. WORLD REV. 231, 232 (2007).   
52
  See, e.g., Guang gao jing ying gong si zhang cheng [the model company constitution for an 
advertising company], CHINALAWINFO (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.); see also ZUI XIN JING BIAN 
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4. The General Meeting Has Ultimate Control 
The general meeting is in a position to control the board of directors.  
The board is obliged to implement the resolutions of the general meeting, 
and a director who refuses to do so may be removed.53  Even though this 
feature of the general meeting has already been stated above, it should be 
stressed here again because of its central importance when considering the 
general meeting’s litigational representative power. 
5. The Representative Power Resides in the Legal Representative 
Under the General Code of the Civil Law of the PRC (“GCCL”),54 
which is China’s provisional civil code, a legal person exercises its powers 
through its “legal representative.”55  Under the 2005 Company Law, the 
legal representative of a company represents the company by entering into 
transactions and prosecuting proceedings on behalf of the company in 
normal circumstances.56  However, the aforementioned litigational powers of 
the board of directors and supervisory board57 supplement the representative 
power of the legal representative. 
The adoption of the legal representative mechanism was not based on 
any doctrinal considerations.  In fact, this mechanism originated from the 
former Soviet Union.58  This system was first adopted in the revolutionary 
bases before the founding of the PRC in 1949 to ensure the productive 
efficiency of, and the party’s leadership in, the war industry.59  Since 1949, 
state-owned enterprises have used the system.60  The notion of the legal 
representative was codified for the first time in 1979 when the EJV Law 
Implementation Rules were enacted.61  Rule 37 of the Implementation Rules 
provides that the chairperson of an EJV company is the legal representative 
                                                                                                                              
ZHONGGUO GONG SI FA SHI WU QUAN SHU [THE LATEST ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINESE COMPANY LAW 
PRACTICE] 200-07 (1994); QI YE GAI ZHI BING GOU FA LÜ SHI WU [LEGAL PRACTICE ON ENTERPRISE 
RECONSTRUCTION AND MERGER] 342 (2006), and GONG SI ZHANG CHENG FAN BEN DA QUAN [A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF MODEL COMPANY CONSTITUTIONS] (Zhongtian Law Electronic Press CD-ROM, 2006). 
53
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, arts. 47(2), 54(2), 109.  
54
  China does not have a comprehensive civil code yet. The General Code of the Civil Law serves as 
a provisional civil code.  See generally General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6. 
55
  Id. art. 38.  
56
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 13. 
57
  See supra text accompanying notes 45, 49. 
58
  Yang Ji, supra note 9, at 125. 
59
  Id. 
60
  Id.  See also Gu Minkang, supra note 10, at 49; WANG LIMING, ZHONGGUO MIN FA DIAN CAO AN 
JIAN YI GAO JI SHUO MING [A DRAFT CIVIL CODE OF CHINA AND EXPLANATORY NOTE] 295-96 (2004). 
61
  Yang Ji, supra note 9, at 125. 
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of that company.62  The concept of the legal representative was subsequently 
adopted in the GCCL63 and in the 1993 Company Law.64  As previously 
noted,65 the concept and functions of the legal representative were kept 
intact under the 2005 Company Law. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IN CORPORATE 
PROCEEDINGS 
The way in which the legal representative is conceptualized affects 
and changes the options available to the company when no legal 
representative is available or the legal representative is ineffective.  When 
the legal representative conducts proceedings in the name of the company, 
the representative acts either as the company itself or as the company’s 
agent.  The legal representative can be regarded as the company itself only if 
the individual can be conceptualized as one of the company’s organs.  This 
section suggests that the legal representative should be viewed as an agent 
rather than an organ of the company. 
A. Is the Legal Representative an Organ of the Company? 
Neither the 2005 Company Law nor the GCCL contains express 
provisions on the nature of the relationship between the company and its 
legal representative.  Article 38 of the GCCL provides that the legal 
representative is the person responsible for representing a legal person in the 
exercise of their rights and powers (zhiquan) in accordance with statutory 
provisions or provisions of the legal person’s constitution.66  Article 13 of 
the 2005 Company Law stipulates the types of company officers who may 
be appointed as the company’s legal representative.67  Neither Article 38 nor 
Article 13, however, refers to the capacity in which the legal representative 
represents the company to exercise its rights and powers.  Most scholars of 
Chinese company law and civil law seem to agree that the legal 
representative, like the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of directors, 
and the board of supervisors, functions as an organ rather than as an agent of 
                                           
62
  Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 20, 1983), art. 34, translated in http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.). 
63
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.  
64
  1993 Company Law, supra note 24, arts. 45, 113. 
65
  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
66
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.  
67
  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 13.  
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the company. 68  None of them, however, has defined the meaning of “organ” 
or has based their claims on any proper legal authorities. 
Most common law jurisdictions define corporate organs as certain 
groups of people in whom the company law vests an original authority to 
commit the company to the legal consequences of the decisions made for it 
or to delegate to others.69  According to this definition, the corporate organs 
of a company mean the board of directors and the general meeting.70  The 
Chinese judiciary seems to accept this conception of a corporate organ.  For 
example, the Beijing Higher People’s Court expresses the view in its 
company law adjudication guidelines that board and general meeting 
resolutions constitute corporate acts.71  According to this notion of a 
corporate organ, however, the legal representative cannot be regarded as a 
corporate organ.72  The 2005 Company Law does not vest any power in the 
representative to commit the company or make any corporate decisions.  The 
legal representative must act according to the will and intention of the 
company,73 which are formed in normal circumstances by the general 
meeting, the board of directors, and the board of supervisors.74 
Admittedly, a limited liability company, in practice, may authorize 
through its constitution the chairperson of the board of directors, or the 
executive director where the company does not have a board, to make 
decisions on transactions if their amount does not exceed a certain limit.75  
However, this practice does not mean that the legal representative is granted 
decision-making power in relation to litigation matters.  The 2005 Company 
Law is silent on the location of decision-making powers with respect to 
litigation.  If a company’s management will and intention is formed by the 
board of directors,76 and if the power to litigate falls within the general 
                                           
68
  JIANG PING ET AL., supra note 35; ZHOU YOUFEN, XIN GONGSIFA LUN [A NEW SURVEY ON 
CORPORATION LAW] 80-81 (2006).  See also PENG WANLIN, TAN YOUTU & LI KAIGUO, MIN FA XUE [CIVIL 
LAW] 136 (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2002); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW]  250 (Jiang 
Ping ed., China University of Political Science and Law Press 2000); WEI ZHENYING, MINFA [CIVIL LAW] 
170 (Peaking University Press 2000). 
69
  FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 212.  See also DAVIES, supra note 1, at 178. 
70
  FORD ET AL., supra note 31, at 212. 
71
  Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan guan yu shen li gong si jiu fen an jian ruo gan wen ti de zhi dao 
yi jian [Some Guiding Opinions of Beijing Higher People’s Court on the Trial of Company Law Cases], 
(Beijing High People’s Ct., Feb. 24, 2004） LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.). 
72
  But see supra text accompanying notes 47-50 (China’s company law regime regards the 
supervisory board as one of the company’s organs). 
73
  WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, supra note 41, at 47-48. 
74
  See supra text accompanying notes 41, 46, and 50. 
75
  Interview with Jiang Da Xing, Professor, Nanjing University of Law School (Aug. 20, 2007). 
76
  See supra text accompanying notes 42, 46. 
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power of management,77 then normally the power to make decisions about 
litigation should reside in the board of directors.78 
In addition, the possibility for the company to delegate power to an 
executive officer to commit the company for certain transactional purposes 
does not mean that the legal representative is an organ of the company.  
When a company officer is appointed as the company’s legal representative 
and has been granted the power to make a transactional decision, that power 
lies in the officer’s capacity as the company’s executive officer (if the 
individual is the board chairperson or the company manager) or the 
company’s executive organ  (if the individual is the company’s executive 
director where the company does not have a board),79 not the officer’s 
capacity as the company’s legal representative.  The 2005 Company Law 
does not confer any decision-making powers on the legal representative.80 
If the word “organ” is used to describe the legal representative as the 
implementation organ for the company’s decisions, then the usage of that 
word becomes conceptually inconsequential.  Such usage cannot prevent the 
legal representative from being recognized as an agent of either the company 
or a company organ in which the power to commit the company is vested. 
B. Can the Legal Representative Be Treated as an Agent of the 
Company? 
The GCCL defines an agent (daili) as a person who performs civil 
juristic acts in the name of the principal within the scope of the granted 
authority.81  A civil juristic act is a legitimate act of a person or a legal 
person to establish, change, or terminate civil rights or obligations.82  The 
                                           
77
  There is a consensus among common law courts that the power to litigate falls within the general 
power of management.  See Breckland Group Holding Ltd. v. London and Suffolk Properties Ltd., (1989) 4 
B.C.C. 542 (Ch.); Mitchell & Hobbs (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mill, (1996) 2 B.C.L.C. 102 (Q.B.); Massey v. Wales; 
Massey v. Cooney, (2003) 47 A.C.S.R. 1 (Austl.). 
78
  This is indeed the opinion of the Legal System Working Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, although the view on the board of directors’ power to litigate is expressed in a special context 
(where a need for suing a defaulting member of the supervisory board arises).  THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S 
CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 218.  The supervisory board’s power to 
litigate where the alleged defendant is a director is apparently provided to address the concern that the 
board of directors is often reluctant to sue their board colleagues.  See J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 237-38 (1993). 
79
  The executive director of a company that does not have a board of directors constitutes the 
executive organ of the company.  THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS LEGAL SYSTEM WORK COMMITTEE, 
supra note 12, at 218. 
80
  See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.  
81
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 63. 
82
  Id. art. 54.  
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principal is responsible for the liability that the agent has incurred within the 
scope of the individual’s authority.83 
Under the GCCL definition, the kind of service that an agent performs 
on behalf of the principal is restricted to civil juristic acts.84  The concept of 
agency, however, can be broadly understood.  If a person confers power on 
another to engage in activities with legal consequences, in so far as the 
former is bound by the legal consequence of the act done by the latter on the 
former’s behalf,85 the latter can be arguably viewed as the agent of the 
former, even if the act done on behalf of the former does not amount to a 
civil juristic act.86 
There is no problem in considering the legal representative as an agent 
of the company for transactional purposes even under the definition 
provided in the GCCL.  The legal representative represents the legal person, 
the company, to exercise its powers granted by the law, including the power 
to do civil juristic acts.87  The liability incurred within the scope of the legal 
representative’s business activities is attributable to the legal person or the 
company.88  To the extent that the power of the legal representative is 
exercised to perform civil juristic acts, there is no conceptual problem in 
treating the legal representative as an agent of the legal person. 
In fact, the legal representative is viewed as an agent in China’s civil 
law framework.  An example is Article 50 of the PRC Contract Law, which 
provides that the legal person will not be bound to a contract entered into on 
its behalf where the legal representative has exceeded the limit of his or her 
authority if the other party to the contract knew or ought to have known 
                                           
83
  Id. art. 63. 
84
  Id. 
85
  It is is a basic tenet of agency law in both civil law and common law jurisdictions that the 
principal is bound to the legal consequence of the act done by her agent who acted within the scope of her 
authority.  On the position in civil law jurisdictions, see MINPŌ, arts. 99-101, translated in MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (TRANSLATION) (1972); Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] 
Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 164-66 (F.R.G.).  On the common law side, see F.M.B. 
REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 1, 303 (Sweet & Maxwell 17th ed. 2001); W.A. 
Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 869 (1920). 
86
  See LIANG HUIXING, MINFA ZONGLUN [GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] 251-52 (2d ed. 
2001); MU XIAOYUAN, DAI LI FA LI LUN YU SHI WU [THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF 
AGENCY] 4, 14 (East China University of Science and Technology Press 1998). 
87
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 38.   
88
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 43; Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu guan che 
zhi xing “zhong hua ren min gong he guo min shi fa tong ze” ruo gan wen ti de yi jian (shi xing) [Some 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Implementation of the PRC General Principles of Civil 
Law (Trial)] Fa (Ban) Fa 1988 No. 6, art. 58. 
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about this fact.89  The principle underlying Article 50 is the doctrine of 
apparent authority, which is a principle of agency law.90 
It is also possible to conceptualize the legal representative as an agent 
of the company for litigational purposes, at least once the broader notion of 
agency is adopted.  A person who engages another person to conduct 
proceedings on that person’s behalf will be bound by the consequence of the 
litigation so conducted.91  It is, therefore, conceptually possible to treat the 
person who conducts legal proceedings on behalf of another person as the 
agent of the latter-mentioned person.92  It is generally accepted in China that 
the relationship between a litigant and a person who conducts the litigant’s 
civil proceedings is governed by the principles of agency.93 
In a civil law jurisdiction, a person who has the power to conduct the 
corporate proceedings can be technically treated as a statutory agent of the 
company for the purpose of civil litigation.  The 1992 Code of Civil 
Procedure of Japan, for example, expressly provides that its provisions on 
statutory agents94 are applicable mutatis mutandis to the representative of a 
legal person,95 and a statutory agent of a person without litigation capacity 
shall be appointed pursuant to, among other things, the provisions of the 
Civil Code.96 
If the legal representative does not constitute one of the company’s 
organs and if it is conceptually and technically possible to regard the legal 
representative as an agent of the company for both transactional and 
litigational purposes, then in the absence of contrary provisions, the legal 
representative should be viewed as an agent of the company. 
                                           
89
  Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, 
effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 50, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.). 
90
  General Code of the Civil Law, supra note 6, art. 66; MU XIAOYUAN, supra note 86, at 50.  
91
  MU XIAOYUAN, supra note 86, at 15.  
92
  There may be some difference between the role of a company’s legal representative and that of a 
lawyer who is retained to conduct proceedings on behalf of the company.  However, insofar as the act of 
the legal representative in representing the company in its proceedings binds the company, the nature of the 
relationship between the company and the legal representative is comparable to that between the company 
and a litigation agent. 
93
  WEI ZHENYING, MINFA [CIVIL LAW] 171-72 (2000); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW] 247 (Kou Zhixin 
ed., 1998); MINFAXUE [CIVIL LAW] 142 (Zheng Li & Wang Zuotang eds., 1995). 
94
  The phrase “statutory agent” is used here to mean a person who acts as a litigation agent for a 
minor, an incompetent person, or half-incompetent person, etc. See MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], 
ch. III, sec. 1, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2005). 
95
  Id. art. 37.  
96
  Id. art. 28.  
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V. RECENT CASES AFFIRM THAT THE GENERAL MEETING CAN BE GIVEN 
CONTROL OVER A COMPANY’S LITIGATION 
Several cases decided since 2002 demonstrate the need to recognize 
the representative power of the general meeting.  These cases illustrate that 
the general meeting’s power of representation may be at issue when the 
company needs to make and/or implement decisions respecting litigation and 
both the board of directors and the validly registered legal representative are 
unavailable.  A validly registered legal representative may be unavailable for 
the following reasons:  the previous legal representative has been removed 
but no replacement has been made yet, the attempted registration for the 
replacement legal representative is invalid, the registration of the 
replacement legal representative has not been completed, the legal 
representative is physically unavailable, or the legal representative’s 
qualifications to continue as the legal representative are in doubt. 
A. Case Study: When the Previous Legal Representative Has Been 
Removed but No Replacement Has Been Appointed 
During the interim between the removal of a company’s previous legal 
representative and the appointment of his or her replacement, the company 
does not have a legal representative.  In this situation, the people’s courts 
have shown a willingness to permit the general meeting to make a decision 
to litigate on behalf of the company where the board of directors is not in a 
position to act. 
This principle is demonstrated in Jiangsu Cold Roll-Forming Steel 
Association v. Wang Xigen,97 although the court did not base its judgment on 
the recognition of the general meeting’s power of representation.98  In 
Jiangsu, the two plaintiff companies founded Jiangsu Province Jinxing Cold 
Roll-Forming Steel Commodities Sales Co. (“Jinxing”) in September 1996.99  
The plaintiff companies were the only two shareholders in Jinxing.100  Wang 
Xigen was appointed as the chairperson of Jinxing’s board of directors, as 
the company's legal representative, and as its general manager.101 
The company did not, however, operate properly under Wang’s 
management.  On March 25, 2002, the board of directors purportedly held a 
                                           
97
  REN MIN FA YUAN AN LI XUAN 2005 DI 2 JI [SELECTED CASES OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 2005, 
VOLUME 2] 223-27 (Sup. People’s Ct. China Applied Legal Studies Research Inst. ed., People’s Court 
Press, 2006) [hereinafter Wang]. 
98
  Id.  
99
  Id. at 223. 
100
  Id. at 224. 
101
  Id. at 223. 
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meeting in which they resolved that Wang be discharged from all positions 
he previously held in Jinxing and that he return the company’s financial 
books, company seal, and other company property in his possession within 
two days.102  No replacement legal representative, however, was appointed 
after the meeting.  A similar resolution was subsequently passed in a second 
general meeting demanding that Wang return the company’s property and 
the company seal within five days.103  Despite being notified, Wang failed to 
attend either of the two meetings.104  Wang further refused to comply with 
the resolutions of both the board and the general meeting.105  The company’s 
two shareholders brought an action against Wang to recover Jinxing’s 
property.106 
The trial court dismissed the action because both the purported board 
meeting and the general meeting suffered from procedural defects.107  The 
court pointed out that Articles 43 and 48 of the 1993 Company Law required 
general meetings be chaired by the chairperson of the board of directors, and 
that board meetings similarly be called and chaired by the chairperson of the 
board.108  Both the board meeting and the general meeting of Jinxing, 
however, were not called or chaired by Wang.109 
The appellate court, the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court, upheld 
the shareholders appeal.110  The court ruled that the resolutions of both the 
board and the general meeting were effective and ordered Wang to return the 
company property within ten days.111  The court reasoned that although both 
the board meeting and the general meeting suffered from minor procedural 
defects, the resolutions of the two meetings, the content of which was 
lawful, reflected the will and intentions of the shareholders.112 
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court appeared concerned 
about the nature of the action, even though the issue of the plaintiff’s 
standing was quite apparent.  The cause of action belonged to the company, 
yet the plaintiffs were the company’s only two shareholders rather than the 
company itself.  This might suggest that the action be considered a 
derivative action, but a closer reading reveals that it is not. 
                                           
102
  Id. at 224-25. 
103
  Id. at 225.  
104
  Id. 
105
  Id. 
106
  Id. at 224. 
107
  Id. at 225-26. 
108
  Id. at 225. 
109
  Id. 
110
  Id. at 226. 
111
  Id. at 226-27.  
112
  Id. at 226.  
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The 1993 Company Law did not provide for derivative actions.113  
The circumstances and the manner under which a derivative action could be 
brought were provided in the relevant guidelines issued by the higher 
people’s court of the individual province or of the municipality with 
provincial status.114  The guidelines issued by the Higher People’s Court of 
Jiangsu province,115 where the Jiangsu case was decided, stipulated that a 
shareholder might bring a derivative action only when the company was 
                                           
113
  In practice, however, derivative actions were permitted before the enactment of the 2005 
Company Law, which provides for such actions.  Derivative actions taken before January 1, 2006 were 
based on a judicial interpretation provided by the Supreme People’s Court in 1994 entitled, Zui gao ren min 
fa yuan guan yu zhong wai he zi jing ying qi ye dui wai fa sheng jing ji he tong jiu fen, kong zhi he ying qi 
ye de wai fang yu mai fang you li hai guan xi, he ying qi ye de zhong fang ying yi shei de ming yi xiang ren 
min fa yuan qi su wen ti de fu han [Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on When Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Has an External Controversy over Economic Contract, and the Foreign Side Which Controls 
the Joint Venture, Has Direct-Interest Relations with the Seller, in Whose Name Shall the Chinese Side of 
the Joint Venture File a Lawsuit to the People’s Court] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 4, 
1994), CHINALAWINFO, dispatch no.: fa jing [1994] 269 hao (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (P.R.C.).  In the 
above-mentioned judicial interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court expressed the view that, where the 
board of directors had made a decision not to sue a party who was connected to the controller of the 
company and who had injured the interests of the company, a shareholder should be permitted to take an 
action on behalf of the company.  The judicial interpretation, however, did not mention whether the action 
should be taken in the shareholder’s own name.  It was not necessary to do so, given that the contract in the 
case in question contained an arbitration clause and the Supreme People’s Court expressed the view that the 
dispute should be resolved through arbitration, not a court action.  For a case where derivative actions were 
allowed under the previous company law regime, see Dong shi zhang de xing wei sun hai gong si li yi, gu 
dong shi fou you quan xiang qi ti qi su song? [Does an individual shareholder have the right to sue the 
chairperson of the board of directors where the chairperson has injured the interests of the company?] in 2 
YI FA SHUO FA—GONG SI HE HUO JIU FEN AN LI [DISCUSSING LAW THROUGH THE LAW—CASES ON 
COMPANY AND PARTNERSHIP DISPUTES] 182-85 (Wang Ming  & Song Caifa eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Individual Shareholder].  See also Yan Gengbin, Dui yi qi gu dong pai sheng su song an de fa lü fen xi [A 
Legal Analysis of a Case on Derivative Actions] in GONG SI FA YI NAN WEN TI JIE XI [ANALYSIS ON 
DIFFICULT COMPANY LAW ISSUES] 204 (Qi Qi & Zhou Bihua eds., 2d ed. 2005).  It has always been 
recognized in China that a company’s right can only be enforced by the company itself, and derivative 
actions were and are permitted only where the company fails to exercise the right.  See Individual 
Shareholder, supra at 184. On the right of shareholders to take derivative actions under the current 
company law regime, see 2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 152.  
114
  See, e.g., Shanghai shi gao ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li she ji gong si su song an jian ruo gan 
wen ti de chu li yi jian (yi) [Shanghai High People’s Court’s Opinions on the Adjudication of Company 
Law Cases (one)] (Shanghai High People’s Ct., June 12, 2003), § 1(5), available at 
http://www.luxinlaw.com/News/Show.asp?id=1382 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.); Jiangsu sheng gao 
ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li shi yong gong si fa an jian ruo gan wen ti de yi jian (shi xing) (yi) 
[Jiangsu Province High People’s Court Opinions on the Adjudication of Company Law Cases (trial) (one)] 
(Jiangsu Province High People’s Ct., Jun. 3, 2003), § 17, available at 
http://www.lawyerwu.com/data/2005/0907/article_1120.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter Jiangsu Opinion]; Beijing shi gao ji ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li gong si jiu fen an jian ruo 
gan wen ti de zhi dao yi jian (shi xing) [Beijing High People’s Court Guiding Opinions on the Adjudication 
of Company Law Cases (trial)] (Beijing High People’s Ct., Feb. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.ny148.cn/main/news_view.asp?newsid=1133 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) (P.R.C.).  These court 
opinions are reprinted in BEIJING HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT, GONG SI FA XIN XING YI NAN AN LI PAN JIE [A 
STUDY OF THE NEW AND COMPLICATED COMPANY LAW CASES] 281-99 (2006). 
115
  Jiangsu Opinion, supra note 114, § 17. 
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unable, or otherwise failed, to take action against a senior company officer 
or a controlling shareholder who had allegedly injured the interests of the 
company.  The guideline also stated, “[t]he company shall be joined in the 
action as a third party.”116 
A people’s court may allow a third party to join a proceeding where 
the outcome of the litigation will affect the interests of the third party.117  
Where this occurs, the name of the third party participating in the action will 
normally appear in the court judgment.118  In Jiangsu, there was no 
indication that the company itself was unable, or otherwise failed, to take 
action against Wang before the proceeding was commenced.  In addition, 
Jinxing’s name is not recorded in the judgment of the case, proving that the 
company did not join the action as a third party.  The proceeding, therefore, 
could not have been a derivative action. 
It is also impossible to view the action against Wang as having been 
brought by Jinxing’s board of directors.  The plaintiffs were not directors of 
Jinxing even though they each nominated a director to the board.119  Nor did 
the purported board meeting on March 25, 2002 result in a decision to take a 
legal action against Wang.120 
The proceedings of the Jiangsu case can, however, be considered as 
having been authorized and raised by the general meeting because the two 
plaintiffs were the only shareholders of the company.121  Although the  
general meeting was not held to specifically make a decision on the 
commencement of the action against Wang, the result of such a meeting, 
even if held, would be the same.122  If the purported general meeting on 
April 15, 2002 could not be rendered ineffective based on procedural 
defects, as the court held,123 then the lack of such a procedure should not bar 
viewing the shareholders’ decision as a decision of the general meeting.  
Indeed, under the 2005 Company Law, unanimous consent by the 
                                           
116
  Id. (emphasis added).  
117
  Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, 
effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 56, translated in 4 P.R.C. LAWS 185, 196 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law]. 
118
  Interview with Sun Jian Han, Judge, Huzhou Intermediate People’s Court (Nov. 1, 2006). 
119
  See Wang, supra note 97, at 224. 
120
  Id. at 224-25. 
121
  Id. at 224. 
122
  This is the position taken by common law courts.  See, e.g., Justice Neville’s observation in 
Marshall’s Valve Gear Company, Ltd. v. Manning Wardle & Co. Ltd., (1909) 1 CH 267, 272 (U.K.). 
123
  The problems caused by requiring that the general meeting be called by the board of directors and 
be chaired by the chairperson of the board under the prior Company Law have been recognized and 
remedied under the 2005 Company Law.  Under Article 41, where the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors refuse to call for a general meeting, such a meeting can be called and chaired by shareholders 
holding ten percent or more voting rights.  2005 Company Law, supra note 11, art. 41. 
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shareholders is the equivalent to a decision of the general meeting, even if 
no general meeting has been held.124 
In Jiangsu, the court appears to have recognized the representative 
power of the general meeting.  The court’s approval of an action brought by 
the only shareholders of the company, which, as stated previously,125 can be 
seen as an action commenced by the general meeting, must be based on the 
court’s recognition of the general meeting’s representative power. 
As discussed in Part IV, there is no doctrinal barrier to recognizing the 
general meeting’s representative power.  The legal representative can be 
treated as the company’s agent in litigation.  When this agent is unavailable 
or ineffective, the company should be able to act on its own behalf through 
one of its organs, such as the general meeting.  Even if the legal 
representative functions as the company’s “implementation organ,” where 
the original implementation organ is ineffective or unavailable, a decision-
making organ should be able to implement its own decision through another 
servant or a lawyer. 
From a doctrinal perspective, is it more desirable to insist on having 
the action brought by the company’s new legal representative, once 
appointed, rather than allowing the general meeting to represent the 
company?  Probably not.  There is often a temporal gap between the 
company’s decision to change its legal representative and the amending of 
the BICA legal representative registration.  Denying the general meeting’s 
power to represent the company in such a situation may deprive the 
company of its ability to control its own litigation during the temporal gap.  
A suspension of the company’s ability to defend its interests and vindicate its 
rights through legal proceedings may cause injury to the interests of the 
company and its investors.  It may also have the effect of holding up 
commercial activities and hampering economic development.  The 
circumstances involving such a temporal gap are discussed in the next two 
cases. 
B. Case Study: When the Attempted Registration of the Replacement 
Legal Representative Is Invalid 
An attempted registration of the replacement legal representative may 
be invalid if the company does not follow prescribed procedures.  When this 
occurs, the company does not have a legal representative because the 
previous legal representative has been removed and a replacement has not 
                                           
124
  Id. art. 38. 
125
  See supra text accompanying note 121. 
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been appointed.  In these cases, the people’s courts have tended to recognize 
the general meeting’s power to exercise control over corporate decisions on 
conducting legal proceedings. 
This is illustrated in Yan Yu Cheng v. Nanjing Shihua Construction 
Supervision Co.126 Nanjing Shihua Construction Supervision Co. (“Shihua”) 
was incorporated as a limited liability construction company on January 28, 
2000.127  The four initial shareholders of the company were Yan, the 
appellant in the case, Fang Xuechu, Yang Lisheng and Xi Yang Yang 
Enterprise Co.128  Yan, being the majority shareholder, was elected as the 
executive director and the legal representative of the company at Shihua’s 
first general meeting.129 
At the second general meeting held on August 14, 2000, the company 
passed a resolution to reorganize the company’s shareholding and 
organizational structures.130  The meeting resolved to establish a board of 
directors and appointed Wang Liangxi, not Yan, to be the chairperson of the 
board of directors and the company’s legal representative.131  All 
shareholders, except Yan, signed the minutes of this meeting. 
On September 16, 2000, Yan chaired a shareholders’ office meeting 
(gudong bangong huiyi) attended by Fang and Yang.132  The meeting 
resolved that, inter alia, Yan needed more time to consider the resolution of 
the second general meeting.  This same meeting further resolved that if the 
three attendees of the office meeting failed to reach a consensus on the 
rearrangement of the company’s capital structure by September 22, 2000, the 
resolution of the second general meeting should be implemented.133  On 
September 18, Yan informed the general meeting in writing that he wished to 
withdraw his contribution towards the company’s registered capital and to 
resign from all posts he held within the company.134 
On September 22, the third general meeting resolved to accept Yan’s 
resignation and reconfirm the resolution of the second general meeting to 
                                           
126
  Nanjing Shihua jian she gong cheng jian li you xian gong si su Yan Yucheng dong shi sun hai 
gong si li yi an [Nanjing Shihua Const. Project Supervision Co. v. Dir. Yan Yucheng RE harming company 
interests], ZHONGGUO SHEN PAN AN LI YAO LAN (2003 NIAN SHANG SHI SHEN PAN AN LI JUAN) [A 
COLLECTION OF CHINESE TRIAL CASES (2003 COMMERCIAL CASES COLLECTION)] 226 (2004) (Nanjing 
Interm. People’s Ct, 2002) [hereinafter Shihua]. 
127
  Id.  
128
  Id. at 227.  
129
  Id. 
130
  Id.   
131
  Id.   
132
  Id. 
133
  Id. 
134
  Id. 
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appoint Wang as the chairperson of the board and as the company’s legal 
representative.135  Accordingly, Shihua submitted an application to BICA to 
update the registration of the company’s legal representative.136  BICA 
approved the application on December 13, 2000.137  The general meeting 
held its fourth meeting on December 29, 2001 and again resolved to reaffirm 
the validity of the resolution passed in the second general meeting on the 
change of legal representative.138 
Shihua then requested several times in vain that Yan return, in 
particular, the company’s registration certificates and the company seal.139  
In June 2001, Wang, in his capacity as the company’s legal representative, 
commenced a legal proceeding against Yan to recover the company’s 
property.140  The trial court ordered Yan to return to Shihua company 
property that was in his possession, reasoning that the legal rights of a duly 
incorporated company were protected by law.141 
Yan appealed the case to the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court on 
the grounds that, inter alia:  1) Shihua used a false seal to execute the 
statement of claim (as the original seal was still in the possession of the 
defendant, Yan), and 2) the trial court erred by validating Wang’s 
appointment as chairperson of the board of directors (and hence the legal 
representative) of the company.142  Yan further alleged that the resolution of 
the second general meeting regarding Wang’s appointment as chairperson of 
the board contravened Order No. 16 of the Ministry of Construction.143 
Order No. 16 provided that to change the legal representative of a 
construction supervision company, the company must complete the 
replacement procedures through an original qualifying department before 
applying to BICA.144  Shihua, however, did not complete the preliminary 
reappointment procedures before filing to change the legal representative 
registration with BICA,145 making the appointment of Wang as Shihua’s 
legal representative arguably invalid.146 
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It followed, argued the appellant, that whether Wang was capable of 
initiating a proceeding on behalf of the company was uncertain.147  The 
respondent replied that Shihua’s general meeting had replaced the appellant 
with Wang as the company’s legal representative through lawful 
procedures.148  The respondent also argued that it was the company’s will 
and intention to change its legal representative and to commence the 
proceeding against the appellant.149 
The appellate court dismissed Yan’s appeal on the ground that 
commencing the proceeding against the appellant was the company’s will 
and intention, which was formed and expressed by the company’s general 
meeting.150  The court observed that Shihua, as a limited liability company, 
was entitled to determine who had the right to custody of its certificates and 
company seal.151  The court pointed out that the crux of the case was not 
whether Wang was able to act as the company’s legal representative in 
relation to the proceeding against Yan, but whether it was the company’s true 
will and intention to commence the legal action.152 
The court reasoned that a company’s will and intention are expressed 
by its organs.153  In general, a company’s will and intention can be evidenced 
by the signature of the company’s legal representative and the company 
seal.154  In special circumstances, such as where there is friction among 
shareholders, or, as in Shihua, a change of legal representative, or where the 
effect of the two different seals is in question, the general meeting has the 
power to represent the company to express the company’s will and 
intention.155  This is because the general meeting is the company’s supreme 
power organ and its resolutions are binding on all shareholders.156 
The appellate court also pointed out that both the second and fourth 
general meetings resolved by a two-thirds majority to relieve the appellant 
from his position as the company’s legal representative and to require him to 
return company property that was in his possession.157  This meant that 
taking an action against the appellant was the will and intention of Shihua, 
rather than the personal will of Wang, who purported to act as the legal 
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representative of the company.158  Shihua’s power to commence legal 
proceedings, therefore, was not affected by whether Wang could be 
appointed as the legal representative of the company or whether the 
registration of the new legal representative was valid.159 
Theoretically, the court did not need to determine the general 
meeting’s representative power to decide the case.  The same result could 
have been reached by curing the procedural defects relating to Wang’s 
appointment.  This could have been done, for example, by undoing the BICA 
registration of Wang as the company’s legal representative and asking the 
company to complete the pre-registration approval procedures as required 
under Order No. 16 before re-lodging the change of legal representative 
registration with BICA.  The court had general power to stay proceedings 
under the PRC Civil Procedure Law.160  The court could, therefore, have 
chosen to stay the proceeding to allow time to remedy the defects in Wang’s 
appointment.  Once Wang had been properly appointed by curing the 
procedural defects, the proceeding could have been resumed as originally 
planned. 
A broad ruling on the general meeting’s representative power, 
however, makes better sense.  It takes time to cure the procedural defects 
relating to the reappointment of a legal representative.  An order to stay 
proceedings would leave a temporal gap between the dismissal of the legal 
representative and the finalization of the process to approve and register the 
replacement.  For this reason, the court's determination of the general 
meeting’s representative power will help protect the interests of the company 
and its investors as well as promote commercial activities. 
Doctrinally, the court’s judgment in Shihua was sound.  The judgment 
was based squarely on its decision that the general meeting has the power to 
represent a company in litigation proceedings.  As previously discussed in 
Part IV, there was no doctrinal barrier to recognizing the representative 
power of the general meeting for litigation purposes. 
The case did not, however, mention whether the board of directors, 
established pursuant to the resolution of the second general meeting, had 
reached any resolution on the commencement of the action against Yan.  
Assuming that the board held a meeting and reached a resolution on this 
matter, perhaps the reason the court did not rely on the resolution was 
because the replacement legal representative—who must be the chairperson 
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of the board161—was not first approved by the qualification control 
department as required under Order No. 16.162  Thus, there was no properly 
appointed chairperson of the board, and no board meeting can be held 
without a chairperson.163 
C. Case Study: When the Registration of the Replacement Legal 
Representative Has Not Been Completed 
The previous two cases involved circumstances where the company 
did not have a legal representative to represent itself.  A similar situation 
occurs when the replacement of the representative has been made, but the 
registration of the replacement has not been completed.  This was the 
situation that the court in Shanghai Tongxin Pharmaceutical Co. v. Shanghai 
Public Housing Assets Management Co. (“Shanghai”) encountered.164  The 
plaintiff entered into a land use right transfer contract with the defendant.165  
Zhou Guozhu, the legal representative and the chairperson of the board of 
directors, executed the agreement on behalf of the plaintiff company.166  
Subsequently, a major change in shareholding took place.167  As a result, a 
new board chairperson and legal representative, Zhang Xinguo, was 
appointed.168  Before the change of the BICA registration regarding the 
replacement of the board chairperson and legal representative was 
completed, Zhou sought to rescind the land use right transfer contract.169 
The general meeting of the plaintiff company, held with the new 
shareholders in attendance, decided that the action commenced by Zhou was 
inconsistent with the best interest of the company and that the proceeding 
should be dropped.170  The application for the discontinuation of proceedings 
was executed with the signature of Zhang, the new legal representative, 
whose name had not appeared in the relevant registry.171  At the time the 
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application for discontinuation of proceedings was made, the above-
mentioned change of registration had still not been completed.172  
The commentator on this case viewed the application for 
discontinuation as valid on the basis that the failure to complete the 
registration of the new legal representative only affected the quality of the 
publicity generated from the relevant company information, not the actual 
effect of the legal representative’s replacement in the company.173 
It is arguable whether a failure to complete registration will affect the 
legal representative’s replacement in the company.  The person appointed as 
legal representative is only qualified to represent the company when the 
BICA registration has been completed.174  When the application for 
discontinuation was made in Shanghai, the company did not have a validly 
registered legal representative, given that Zhou, the previous legal 
representative, had already been removed.  This means that the court’s 
decision to approve the company’s discontinuation application relied entirely 
on the strength of the general meeting’s resolution.  The court's decision was 
based on the recognition of the general meeting’s representative power.  
Zhang’s power of representation, if any, was granted by the general meeting.  
If Zhang had played a role in the discontinuation application, he would have 
acted as the delegate of the general meeting, rather than the company’s legal 
representative, because he had not been registered with BICA as such. 
D. Case Study: When the Legal Representative Is Physically Unavailable 
or the Ability to Act as the Legal Representative Is in Doubt  
The question of a general meeting’s power of representation may also 
crop up where the company’s legal representative is unavailable or where the 
ability to act as the company’s legal representative is in doubt.  This can 
occur, for example, when the legal representative is under police custody.  
The recent case of Wanhong Co. v. Beimai Import and Export Co. 
(“Wanhong”)175 illustrates that the court may be willing to recognize the 
general meeting’s power to litigate under these circumstances, even though 
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the court in Wanhong appears to have erred by agreeing with the defendant’s 
ungrounded argument regarding shareholders’ litigation rights. 
The plaintiff company, the first defendant company, Heilongjiang 
Province Beimai Import and Export Trading Co. (“Beimai”), and Danwei 
Holdings Co. (“Danwei”) entered into an arrangement to jointly run an 
export business.176  Under the agreement, the plaintiff was responsible for 
obtaining a loan for the first defendant who was in charge of procuring the 
goods to be exported.177  Danwei was to act as the guarantor for the loan.178  
The second defendant, Heilongjiang Province Beidahuang Wheat Industry 
Co. (“Beidahuang”), and the third defendant, Longxing Agricultural 
Development Co. (“Longxing”), were the only shareholders in the first 
defendant company, holding fifty-one percent and forty-nine percent of the 
shares issued by the company, respectively.179  The general manager of 
Beidahuang, which was the majority shareholder in Beimai, was appointed 
as the legal representative of Beimai.180 
It was alleged that the plaintiff company advanced a loan for RMB 17 
million to Beimai in late 2002.181  The cooperative relationship between the 
plaintiff and Beimai ended in early 2003 due to market fluctuation. 182  It was 
alleged that the latter, Beimai, still owed the plaintiff company RMB 7 
million.  The plaintiff brought an action against Beimai for the remaining 
debt and against Beidahung and Longxing for failing to contribute or 
unlawfully withdrawing capital money in their capacity as shareholders.183  
Evidence existed, however, that cast doubt on whether Beimai received the 
allegedly loaned money from the plaintiff company and whether Beidahuang 
and Longxing failed to contribute capital or had otherwise illegally 
withdrawn the capital funds they had contributed.184 
When the action commenced, Beimai was virtually non-existent.  
Both the financial books and the company seal were missing.185  Its legal 
representative was under police custody on a separate matter,186 and the 
                                           
176
  Id. at 2.  
177
  Id. at 3.  
178
  Id. 
179
  Id. at 5.  
180
  Id. at 1.  
181
  Id. at 3. 
182
  Id. 
183
  Under the 2005 Company Law, the shareholders of a limited liability company must contribute the 
total amount of capital, which must be registered with the company registration authority.  2005 Company 
Law, supra note 11, arts. 26-32.  See also Hu Zaichi, Limited Liability Companies, in 1 CHINA COMPANY 
LAW GUIDE, supra note 13, ¶ 45-130. 
184
  Beidahuang, supra note 175, at 6-7. 
185
  Id. at 7. 
186
  Id. 
320 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 2 
 
 
company’s actual location was unknown.187  Thus, the legal representative, 
or even the board, of Beimai was not in a position to defend the proceedings 
on behalf of the company.  Longxing was a fly-by-night company and could 
also not be located.188  The only defendant that was worth suing was, 
therefore, Beidahuang. 
One of the questions presented by the case was whether Beidahuang, 
the majority shareholder, could defend the proceedings on behalf of Beimai 
on the issues brought before the court.189  The court answered this question 
in the affirmative.190  The court reasoned that the majority shareholder had 
standing to defend proceedings in the name of the company because a 
shareholder could take a derivative action against a defaulting company 
officer to vindicate the company’s rights.191 
While the result of the court’s judgment on this issue is justifiable, the 
basis of the judgment is questionable.  In a derivative action, the shareholder 
who initiates a proceeding does so in her own name, rather than in the name 
of the company, against the person who has allegedly harmed the company.  
The court normally allows the company to join as a party in the litigation so 
that the company may be bound by the benefit of the judgment.192  The 
company itself is not, however, a claimant in such an action, as it has not 
consented to the action.193 
Proceedings against the company, on the other hand, can only be 
defended by the company itself.  This means that only a person who has the 
power to represent the company has standing to defend proceedings in the 
name of the company.  This person is, in ordinary circumstances, the legal 
representative of the company.194  A shareholder does not have this 
representative power and does not have the standing to defend an action 
against the company. 
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Despite the court’s mistake in determining the extent of the 
shareholder’s right, the court would have reached the same result had it 
taken into account the general meeting’s power to control corporate actions.  
As previously discussed, there are no doctrinal or practical barriers to 
allowing the general meeting to have control over corporate proceedings 
where the board of directors and the legal representative are both 
unavailable.  In Wanhong, the Beidahuang was a majority shareholder, 
holding fifty-one percent of the issued shares.195  It would have been able to 
pass an ordinary resolution, which simply requires a majority of votes, at the 
general meeting with respect to the litigation. 
The plaintiff company would naturally have rejected this view by 
arguing that no general meeting resolution could have existed if no general 
meeting had been held.  This argument can, however, be countered.  Where 
it is physically or practically impossible for the shareholders to hold such a 
general meeting, the failure to hold the meeting cannot deprive the majority 
shareholders of their ability to form the will and intention of the company.  
The Jinling court upheld the effect of a resolution from a general meeting 
despite procedural defects.196  This is because the defects were caused by the 
defaulting board chairperson who actually refused to call and chair the 
meeting.197 
By parity of reasoning, where the chairperson of the board and the 
only other shareholder are unavailable because they are under police custody 
or have simply disappeared, the impossibility of convening a general 
meeting should not affect the majority shareholder’s power to make 
decisions about litigation proceedings on behalf of the company.198  The 
result of such a meeting, if held, would be a foregone conclusion.199 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The company representation mechanism is only functional when a 
person capable of representing the company is available.  Such a person is 
unavailable when the person granted the power of representation is unable to 
faithfully perform duties or is physically unavailable.  Ironically, the legal 
representative mechanism under China’s company law regime often creates 
situations where the legal representative is unavailable.  Because the power 
of representation is statutorily vested in a senior executive officer, the legal 
representative’s performance is often self-biased.  Furthermore, because the 
power of representation is vested in a single person, the company’s 
competence in controlling its legal proceedings is often questioned when the 
legal representative is physically unavailable or when the representative has 
not delegated his or her power of representation to another.200  The 
requirement that the appointment of the legal representative must be 
approved by and registered with the company registration authority often 
creates a temporal gap between the appointment and the subsequent 
processes with the registration authority.201 
The unavailability of a company’s legal representative often places the 
courts in a dilemma between requiring compliance with the formal rules of 
legal representation and the substantive need for giving effect to the 
intentions of the company and enabling it to resolve disputes or defend its 
interests through court proceedings.  The courts in the cases discussed in this 
Article demonstrate a consistent willingness to prefer the latter to the former.  
However, the courts have not always been able to identify and articulate the 
correct doctrinal basis for their decisions. 
The cases discussed in Part V demonstrate that the issues in each case 
can all be resolved on the basis of the general meeting’s power to control 
corporate proceedings.  Following the justifications discussed in Parts IV 
and V, when a company’s representative mechanism is dysfunctional, the 
general meeting should be regarded as having decision-making and 
representation powers over legal proceedings.  The general meeting’s power 
to control company litigation can, therefore, serve as a doctrinal basis to 
retain the litigational power of the company when the company’s board of 
directors or the legal representative is unavailable or incompetent.  The 
general meeting’s representative power should only be exercisable when a 
legal representative is unavailable, or otherwise incapable of discharging his 
or her role in an unbiased manner. 
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With the general meeting’s power to control corporate actions, the 
inherent deficiency of the legal representative system will be cured.  
Additionally, Chinese companies will be able to enhance their ability to 
settle disputes and protect their interests through legal proceedings.  More 
importantly, this will help strengthen corporate governance under the current 
company law regime by providing an additional avenue through which the 
company may seek to enforce its senior officers’ duties.  Since case 
precedent does not have binding force in China,202 the recognition of the 
general meeting’s power to control company proceedings may be formalized 
by inserting a provision in the 2005 Company Law, or more realistically, by 
Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation on this issue.203 
                                           
202
  He Jiahong, Lun Faguan fa guan Zao zao Fafa [On Judge Made Law] (Apr. 15, 2006), 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/20800/209/2006/4/zh558017584151460023534-0.htm (P.R.C.). 
203
  The Supreme People’s Court has power to provide judicial interpretation on questions concerning 
specific application of laws and decrees in judicial proceedings.  See Organic Law of the People’s Courts 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, rev. Sept. 
2, 1983), art. 33, translated in http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207254.htm (last visited Dec. 
19, 2007) (P.R.C.).  The judicial interpretations provided by the Supreme People’s Court have legal force 
and function to fill the gaps left in legislation and to resolve inconsistencies in legislative provisions.  See 
Zhou Daoluan, Lun si fa jie shi ji qi gui fan hua [On Judicial Interpretations and Their Standardization], 1 
ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 87, 87-91 (1994). 
